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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

practical means of delivery, it is doubtful that the courts would go so far
as to deny federal power over what is clearly jurisdictional gas.
In conclusion, it can be said that Lo-Vaca represents a return to the
view expressed by the Supreme Court prior to the passage of the Natural
Gas Act. Ultimately a ruling by that Court will be necessary in this area
to provide a uniform rule throughout the United States. However, it can
be safely said that the instant case represents a practical and rational
approach to the problem-an approach which the Supreme Court, based
on its prior holdings, should follow.
Vedder J. White

LABOR

RELATIONS-JUDICIAL

REVIEW-FAILURE OF

NLRB To

CERTIFY REPRESENTATION ELECTION BECAUSE OF INFIRMITY IN ITS
OWN PROCEDURE

Is

REVIEWABLE BY DISTRICT COURT.

Miami Newspaper PrintingPressmen's Union v. McCulloch
(D.C. Cir. 1963)
The Union sought certification as bargaining agent for the employees
of Miami Herald Publishing Company. The Board had directed that an
election be held on July 25, 1961, and Herald requested NLRB review of
the election order. This request was denied by the Board acting through
only one of its members. Herald brought suit, and the Board, realizing
that its order denying Herald's request did not conform to section 3(b)
of the act,' vacated the order and set aside the July 25th election. The
2
NLRB then directed that a rerun election be held.
Meanwhile, the Union had instituted proceedings in the district court
claiming that the Board, in ordering a rerun election and in refusing to
certify the July 25th election, was acting contrary to section 9(c) (1), the
mandatory provision of the NLRA requiring the Board to certify.3 The
1. Herald's contention was that the Board's denial of its request to review the
election order was invalid because its request was passed upon by only one Board
member. Herald relied upon § 3(b) of the act, which authorizes delegation by the
Board ".

.

. to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which

it may itself exercise." 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (Supp. IV, 1963).
(Emphasis added.)
2. The rerun election was held on December 5, 1962. Neither of the election
results was disclosed in the case.
3. The Union's argument was that where a question of representation exists.
and an election is held, § 9(c) (1) imposes a mandatory duty on the Board to certify.
The pertinent portion of the statute is as follows: "If the Board finds upon the record
of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." 61 Stat. 143 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (B) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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Union further asserted that this procedure would deny employees voting
rights guaranteed by the act. The district court decided that it had no
jurisdiction, that the Board's action was not in violation of a mandatory
provision, and that this was merely the Board's exercise of its broad discretionary power.
On appeal, the Circuit Court disagreed, stating that federal courts
could assume jurisdiction under the general jurisdictional statutes 4 in two
situations: (1) if Board action results in the denial of a constitutional
right 5 or (2) if the Board acts in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition of the act.' As the second exception applied
here, the court reversed the district court, holding that where a question
of representation exists, and a valid election is held, the certification procedure provided for in section 9(c) (1) 7 is mandatory. Miami Newspaper
Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
The instant case is evidence that courts no longer display their initial
reluctance to review the actions of administrative bodies in cases where
there is no specific provision for review. This trend toward increased
judicial intervention in the administrative processes has been condemned
as being especially harmful in the area of labor relations. Critics base their
comments on the legislative history of the Wagner Act 9 and the TaftHartley Amendments ;10 they contend that Congress, seeking to avoid the
delay often caused by judicial participation, attempted to preclude judicial
review of common NLRB representation actions." Opponents of judicial
review in this area also advance the argument based upon statutory interpretation that since Congress has specifically provided for review in some
portions of the act and has omitted it in others, the inference is strong that
they intended no extension of this function.
This discussion of legislative intent and judicial policy serves as a
background for an examination of the problem with which the court in
the instant case was primarily concerned: the availability of the remedy
of judicial review with regard to certification orders entered in representation proceedings. This question is of special importance due to the determinative role these orders have now assumed in the bargaining process.
4. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade
and commerce against restraints and monopolies." 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1958).
5. Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949).
6. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180 (1958).
7. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (B) (1958).
8. "Tolerance of judicial review has been more and more the rule as against the
claim of administrative finality." Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601, 619,
79 S.Ct. 1351, 1361 (1959) (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., with whom Warren,
C.J., and Black, J., concurred). See also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190, 79
S.Ct. 180, 184-85 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-82, 78 S. Ct. 433,
435 (1958) ; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10, 64 S.Ct. 559, 571 (1944);
Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co., 305 U.S. 177, 183, 59 S.Ct. 160, 163-64 (1938).
9. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
10. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
11.Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 192, 79 S.Ct. 180, 186 (1958).
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In 1940, the case of AFL v. NLRB 12 decided that such review could
not be obtained under section 1013 of the act. There, a labor union, whose
claims concerning the appropriate bargaining unit had been rejected by
the Board, petitioned the Court of Appeals for review under section 10.
The petition was dismissed on the ground that a certification was not a
"final" order within the meaning of that section and as such was not
reviewable by a court of appeals. The opinion also stated that an order
directing an election would meet the same fate. This case failed to decide
14
whether review could be obtained under the general jurisdictional statutes.
After much uncertainty on this point, the Supreme Court finally
provided the answer in Leedom v. Kyne, 15 a case involving a Board determination of the proper membership of a collective bargaining unit. The
Board's action was attacked in a federal district court as being violative
of the NLRA in that it failed to follow the procedure outlined in section
9(b) of the act. The district court granted the relief; this was later affirmed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals.' 6 The Supreme Court also upheld the
Union's contention, saying that the NLRB's failure to obey was an unlawful action in excess of delegated authority and that the federal courts
could exercise their general equity power 1 7 whenever such a violation
occurs. The Court did not characterize the lower court's intervention as
being review in the sense of the term as used in the act-a decision of the
NLRB made within its jurisdiction-but rather characterized it as the striking down of an order outside the scope of the Board's authority granted
in the act. An important distinction which should be drawn is that the
Court in allowing general jurisdiction was enforcing a right given to professional employees, a group specifically mentioned in the NLRA. The
Board had no discretionary power, and its action contrary to the statutory
provision was clearly a violation of a right guaranteed employees by the act.
The result reached by the Supreme Court has had a marked effect
upon the entire area of labor relations. It has demonstrated not only that
federal courts will utilize their general power to obtain jurisdiction, but
also that courts have adopted a theory often voiced by commentators, that
there is a presumption of judicial review.' 8 One important question which
12. 308 U.S. 401, 60 S.Ct. 300 (1940).

13. Section 10(f) of the act contains the following language: "Any person
aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the
relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of
appeals...." 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
14. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958).
15. 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180 (1958). The Court interpreted § 9(b) (1) of the
act which provides, ". . -,the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate
for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees
who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees

vote for inclusion in such unit.

61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1)

(1958). (Emphasis added,)
16. Kyne v. Leedom, 148 F. Supp. 597 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd, 249 F.2d 490 (D.C.
Cir. 1957).
17. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958).
18. 73 HARV. L. Rgv. 84, 217 (1959).
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was raised by Leedom v. Kyne is whether all orders in representation
proceedings are now open to judicial scrutiny. The instant case supplies
a partial answer, for it clearly rules that the exception established by
Leedom v. Kyne is not limited to those sections of the NLRA which are
prohibitive in nature. This is not a startling development of the doctrine,
since it would have been impossible for the courts to draw any type of
reasonable distinction between those provisions which are worded in a
prohibitive manner and those which are worded in terms of requirement.
Another notable aspect of the decision is that the court was involved
with a NLRB order involving certification and has shown that under
certain circumstances these orders are now subject to review. The court
undoubtedly realized that in so doing it was interfering with the selection
of a union as a representative, but here, as is often the case, the outcome
of the rerun election was foreseeable. If it had not passed upon the Board's
order, the Union would have been irreparably injured, since a large
number of the employees who had voted in the July 25th election could not
vote in the rerun election. The court weighed the imminent harm against
the policy of non-interference with the election process. In so doing it
extended the Leedom rule. While reinforcing the authority of the Board
to set aside elections in which coercion is present or where there is a
mechanical defect in the process, the court ruled that this power cannot be
exercised where the defect is caused by the Board itself. The election
which was held on July 25th was not in any way impaired by the NLRB's
failure to pass upon Miami Herald's request for review, and the Board
was bound to certify the results. Failure to do so denied the Union a right
guaranteed by the NLRA thereby giving the district court jurisdiction
over the Union's action. Unions then are considered to have a right to
certification of election results just as the professional employees were
considered to have a right to select a bargaining unit in Leedom v. Kyne.
It must be remembered, however, that this type of judicial review is
limited in its availability; it is not as available as the review of a final order
provided for in section 10 of the act. The principle set out in AFL v.
NLRB, that orders in certification proceedings pursuant to section 9 do
not qualify for judicial review under section 10, is still in effect. 19
Finally the instant case is additional evidence that the federal courts
are more inclined to intervene in NLRB activity. The arguments advanced
by those who opposed the extension of judicial review seem to have been
rejected, and the view espoused by the majority in Leedom v. Kyne now
appears to be favored. Judicial review is a basic right, a traditional power,
and the intention to exclude it must be made specific. 20 This does not
mean, however, that courts are now seeking to override the authority
delegated to administrative bodies by the legislature. Rather, the current
tendency is to limit the Leedom exception to situations where there is a
19. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Leedom, 174 F. Supp. 171, 175 (D.D.C.
1959).
20. Jaffe, The Right To Judicial Review 1, 71 HARV. L. Rpv. 401, 432 (1958).
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